Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization

Constitutions, Regulations, and Taxes: Contradictions of Different Aspects of Decentralization

Alaxander Libman

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper confronts different aspects of decentralization: fiscal decentralization, post-constitutional regulatory decentralization, and constitutional decentralization – using a single dataset from Russian Federation of the Yeltsin period as a politically asymmetric country. It finds virtually no correlation between different decentralization aspects; moreover, three processes of devolution appearing in the same country at the same time seem to be driven by different (though partly overlapping) forces. Hence, a specific aspect of decentralization is hardly able to serve as a proxy for another one or for the overall decentralization process.

Keywords: constitutions; deregulation; decentralization; fiscal decentralization; administrative decentralization; devolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H77 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Date: Written
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