EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic Coopetition of Global Brands: A Game Theory Approach to ‘Nike + iPod Sport Kit’ Co-branding

Flávio Rodrigues, Victória Souza and João Leitão ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Co-branding can be implemented by establishing an agreement of strategic coopetition that allows companies to compete and cooperate simultaneously in order to obtain competitive advantages through operational synergy. With this type of agreement, brands enter markets sharing loyal customers they would be unlikely to reach individually. The main advantages associated with implementation of this form of strategic coopetition are the possibility of jointly communicating brand image, reputation and credibility in a global market where consumers tend to have homogeneous preferences and convergent lifestyles. The strategic coopetition between two global brands, Apple and Nike, through development of the ‘Nike+iPod Sport Kit’ product, serves as a benchmark to illustrate the benefits associated with implementation of coopetitive cooperation agreements. From application of the game theory, simulation of a game of strategic coopetition provided results that confirm global brands obtain benefits, albeit not in equal measure, in terms of adding value to the brand image at a world level.

Keywords: Co-branding; Coopetition; Global brands; Growth of brand value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M31 O32 M13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse and nep-mkt
Date: 2009-07-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16146/1/MPRA_paper_16146.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:16146

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2017-05-12
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:16146