Simulating the enforcement policies for irregular sector in the Italian labour reform

Luigi Bonaventura ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper an agent-based model (abm) will be used to study the effects of enforcement policy in Italy: d.lgs. 124/2004. Three kinds of policy will be tested in the model: control, sanction and legitimacy-regulation. The first policy is based on the number of inspectors present in the economy; the second is defined by the magnitude of punishment; the third is measured by the social legitimacy of regulation. This simulation has produced a number of results, the most important of which are: the negligible influence of control increasing to enforce irregularity; the strong influence of the level of punishment on the irregularity ratio in all Italian areas; the good political choice to increase the social legitimacy to regulation in promoting regularity.

Keywords: enforcement policies; irregular sector; agent-based model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 O17 K42 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-law and nep-reg
Date: 2006-12
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