Implementing VAT in India:Implications for Federal PolityMPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Abstract: Over the last few years, many attempts have been made to implement VAT in India. Initially, all states were to move to VAT system by 2000, but administrative problems and concern over the revenue implications of the change delayed the scheduled implementation. It has been postponed for five times in past five years. In fact, introduction of a full fledged VAT in India seem to present numerous administrative and constitutional difficulties, including the vexed question of union-state relations. In addition to this, implementing VAT in India in context of economic reforms has paradoxical dimensions. On one hand economic reforms have led to more decentralization of expenditure responsibilities which in turn demands more decentralization of revenue raising powers if fiscal accountability is to be maintained. But on the other hand the process of implementation of VAT can lead not only to revenue loss for the states but can also steal away the states’ autonomy indicating more centralization. Thus the need is to develop such a ‘federal friendly model’ of VAT (along with a suitable compensation package) that can be implemented in India without compromising federal principles. Keywords: VAT; India; Federal Polity; subnational vat; national vat; dual vat (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in The Indian Journal of Political Science No (4).Vol (LXVI)(2005): pp. 915-934 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Access Statistics for this paper More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany |
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