On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests

James W. Boudreau () and Nicholas Shunda ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We apply an indirect evolutionary approach to players' perceived prize valuations in contests. Evolution in finite populations leads to preferences that overstate the prize's material value and induce overexpenditure. We establish an equivalence between the behavior evolutionarily stable preferences induce and evolutionarily stable strategies.

Keywords: Contest; Prize valuation; Preference evolution; Evolutionarily stable preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D72 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
Date: 2010-08-25
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests (2012)
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