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Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
Yuval Heller () and
Eilon Solan Tristan Tomala
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.
Keywords: correlated equilbirium; distributed computation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Downloads: (external link) http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25895/ original version (application/pdf)
Related works: Journal Article: Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information (2012) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:25895
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