Nash Equilibrium and Robust Stability in Dynamic Games: A Small-Gain Perspective

Iasson Karafyllis, Zhong-Ping Jiang and George Athanasiou ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilibrium points in dynamic games. Small-gain techniques in modern mathematical control theory are used for the first time to derive conditions guaranteeing uniqueness and global asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium point for economic models described by functional difference equations. Specification to a Cournot oligopoly game is studied in detail to demonstrate the power of the proposed methodology.

Keywords: Dynamic game; Cournot oligopoly; Nash equilibrium; Robust stability; Small gain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 C02 C61 C70 C62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-hpe
Date: 2010-01-07, Revised 2010-09-23
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Published in Computers and Mathematics with Applications 11.60(2010): pp. 2936-2952

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:26890

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