Economic models of consumer protection policies

Mark Armstrong ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper summarizes some of my recent work on consumer protection. I present three theoretical models which illustrate the merits and drawbacks of a number of common consumer protection policies, namely: policies which prevent firms from setting unduly high prices; policies which prevent firms requiring on-the-spot decision making by prospective customers, and policies which prevent suppliers from paying commission payments to sales intermediaries.

Keywords: Consumer protection; consumer search; marketing; commission sales (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D18 M31 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mkt
Date: 2011-11
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