Can issue linkage help mitigate externalities and enhance cooperation

Kim Hang Pham Do, Ariel Dinar and Daene McKinney

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Managing transboundary river basins is never easy and usually involves conflicts. This paper introduces a special class of games with externalities and issue linkage to promote cooperation on transboundary water resources. The paper analyzes whether issue linkages can be used as a form of negotiations on sharing benefits and mitigating conflicts. It is shown that whenever opportunities for linkages exist, countries may indeed contribute towards cooperation. In particular, if the linked games are convex, the grand coalition is the only optimal level of social welfare

Keywords: games with externalities; convexity; s-core; transboundary rivers; issue linkage; international water sharing agreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 C71 D74 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2011-06
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