Optimal quality choice under uncertainty on market development
Lota Tamini ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper analyzes the impact of risk and ambiguity aversion - Knightian uncertainty - on the choice of optimal quality and timing of market entry. Irreversibility of the investment in product development is introduced in a continuous-time stochastic model applying the real option literature. We consider a market characterized by a duopoly with a Stackelberg-Nash game for quality choice. When the follower provides a higher-quality good, the level of quality is decreasing in ambiguity aversion while it is a non-monotonic function of the level of risk. For low levels of risk, the increase of product quality is an efficient response. Up to certain threshold level of risk, risk and ambiguity aversion reduce the optimal quality level and increase the value of waiting when the follower supplies a higher-quality good. The implication is that risk and ambiguity aversion allow the leader to make a sustainable monopoly profit. When the follower supplies a lower-quality good, there is no value for it to wait. It should therefore provide the lowest-quality good possible. In a vertically integrated supply chain firms provide higher quality, and the difference between vertically integrated and non-integrated firms is increasing in risk and ambiguity aversion.
Keywords: Quality; Duopoly; Real option; Vertical integration; Risk; Knightian uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 L13 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40845/1/MPRA_paper_40845.pdf original version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:40845
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Address: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Ekkehart Schlicht ().