Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post

Mark Armstrong ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: An incumbent postal service provider faces two issues which make the design of efficient access pricing especially difficult. First, universal service obligations, together with the presence of significant fixed costs, require retail prices to be out of line with underlying marginal costs. Second, competing firms may be able to bypass the incumbent's delivery network. Within a simple framework, this note analyses how access charges should best be set in the light of these twin constraints.

Keywords: Access pricing; post; regulation; liberalisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L87 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
Date: 2006-05
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http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62/

Related works:
Journal Article: Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service in Post (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:62

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