Civic capital and support for the welfare state
Roy Cerqueti (),
Fabio Sabatini () and
Marco Ventura ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We model the way the interplay between tax surveillance institutions and civic capital shapes taxpayers' support for welfare state. We show that, when tax surveillance is tight, rational civic-minded individuals express greater support for welfare spending than uncivic ones. We provide empirical evidence of these preferences using data from Italy, a country that has long posed a puzzle for public economists for its limited civic capital and large welfare state.
Keywords: welfare state; redistribution; tax surveillance; social trust; civic capital; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H10 H11 H5 H53 Z1 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fdg, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:71566
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