Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

Yuval Heller ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes the implementation of correlated equilibria that are immune to joint deviations of coalitions by cheap-talk protocols. We construct a cheap-talk protocol that is resistant to deviations of fewer than half the players, and using it, we show that a large set of correlated equilibria can be implemented as Nash equilibria in the extended game with cheap-talk. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in general there is no cheap-talk protocol that is resistant for deviations of half the players.

Keywords: non-cooperative games; cheap-talk; correlated equilibrium; strong equilibrium; coalition-proof equilibrium; fault-tolerant distributed computation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-cta and nep-gth
Date: 2005-08-19, Revised 2008-02-26
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http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7716/ orginal version
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15643/ revised version

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:7716

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