All-stage strong correlated equilibrium

Yuval Heller ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A strong correlated equilibrium is a correlated strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria have been defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players receive their part of the correlated profile. In this note we show that an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium (Moreno D., Wooders J., 1996. Games Econ. Behav. 17, 80-113) is immune to deviations at all stages of any pre-play signalling process that implements it. Thus the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.

Keywords: correlated equilibrium; strong equilbrium; coaliton-proof equilbrium; ex-ante; ex-post; common knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2008-06-01
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http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7717/ orginal version
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7903/ revised version
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15644/ revised version

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