Deterrence, Preemption and Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem of Terrorism

Satya P. Das () and Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We develop a game-theoretic analysis of terrorism that examines the interaction between a terrorist organization and multiple target countries, and considers both pre-emption and deterrence as counter-terrorist policies. The damage from terror includes not only the material cost of fatality, injury and loss of property, but also the resultant fear. The fear-effect leads to different kinds of equilibria and implications for counter-terrorism policies. In particular, the model identifies conditions under which greater pre-emption may be the rational response to an increase in terrorism, i.e., it analyzes the merit of the dictum: ``offense is the best defense.'' Further, it examines the characteristics of cooperative behavior among target countries in dealing with the threat of terrorism.

JEL-codes: H77 A13 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Deterrence, preemption and panic: A Common-enemy problem of terrorism (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:8223

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