Three-sided matchings and separable preferences
Somdeb Lahiri ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2008-05-26
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http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8660/ orginal version
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8867/ revised version
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8890/ revised version
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