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Three-sided matchings and separable preferences

Somdeb Lahiri ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.

JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2008-05-26
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Downloads: (external link)
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8660/ orginal version
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8867/ revised version
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8890/ revised version

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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8660