Mixed Duopoly with Price Competition

Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper examines coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE) of a mixed duopoly with price competition where the public firm meets all the demand coming to it. If the private firm is free to supply less than demand, then the unique CPNE involves the competitive price. If however the private firm also has to supply all its demand, then the set of CPNE prices turns out to be an interval, with prices ranging from the socially optimal one, to the price under complete privatization.

Keywords: Mixed duopoly; coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; price competition. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L2 L3 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
Date: 2009-08
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9220/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:9220

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Address: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Ekkehart Schlicht ().