A Panel Bargaining Model within the Regional Boundaries of the South African Grain Industry

Elizabeth Ueckermann, James Blignaut () and Rangan Gupta ()
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Elizabeth Ueckermann: Department of Economics, University of Pretoria

Working Papers from University of Pretoria, Department of Economics

Abstract: The present study defines the bargaining process undertaken between a large number of heterogeneous farmers and a few intermediaries within the deregulated South African grain industry. Based on this process, an outcome was obtained by means of the application of a seemingly unrelated cross-sectional regression model utilising regional panel data relating to the years from 2000 to 2005. The results indicate that the bargaining game yields more efficient results in all the regions for all the market players and to an even greater extent when interregional bargaining takes place. The authors of the present paper suggest that this type of bargaining instrument can serve as a planning tool for the grain producers in order to strengthen their bargaining position in the new free-market environment.

Keywords: non-cooperative games; panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-03
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Journal Article: A Panel Bargaining Model Within the Regional Boundaries of the South African Grain Industry (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pre:wpaper:200706

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