What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It?

Alan S. Blinder and Alan B. Krueger ()

No 103, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.

Abstract: A long tradition in economic theory models economic policy decisions as solutions to optimization problems solved by rational and well-informed agents: A single policymaker minimizes a loss function subject to some constraints. Another body of literature models policy decisions as if they were made by well-informed voters in elections of some sort.

Date: 2004-05
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/99blinderkrueger.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It? (2004)
Working Paper: What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It? (2004)
Working Paper: What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It? (2004)
Journal Article: What Does the Public Know about Economic Policy, and How Does It Know It? (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:cepsud:103

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by David Long ().