Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Orley Ashenfelter () and David Bloom

No 650, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.

Keywords: lawyers; arbitration system; prisoner's dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990-09
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Related works:
Working Paper: Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (1993)
Working Paper: LAWYERS AS AGENTS OF THE DEVIL IN A PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME (1990)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:indrel:650

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