Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments

Sylvain Chassang, Gerard Padro i Miquel and Erik Snowberg
Additional contact information
Gerard Padro i Miquel: London School of Economics
Erik Snowberg: Caltech

No 1262, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program.

Abstract: We study the design of randomized controlled experiments in environments where outcomes are significantly affected by unobserved effort decisions taken by the subjects (agents). While standard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort provision compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs which we call selective trials can help improve the external validity of experiments. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can help experimenters identify when measured treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort provision.

Keywords: randomized controlled trials; selective trials; blind trials; incentivized trials; marginal treatment effects; mechanism design; selection; heterogeneous beliefs; compliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C81 C93 D82 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08
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http://detc.princeton.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/wp003.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2012)
Working Paper: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2010)
Working Paper: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2010)
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