Why do underground reducing policies often fail their scope? Some answers from the Italian experience

Bruno Chiarini (), Marco Di Domizio and Elisabetta Marzano

No 8_2008, Working Papers from D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy

Keywords: Irregular labour input; enforcement; Fiscal Authority efficiency; regularization policy; incentives in the firm’s tax structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Date: 2008-08
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Journal Article: WHY DO UNDERGROUND REDUCING POLICIES OFTEN FAIL THEIR SCOPE? SOME ANSWERS FROM THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE (2009)
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