Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities: Towards a general theory of expectational coordination?

Guesnerie Roger ()

PSE Working Papers from PSE (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: This paper contrasts the views of expectational coordination in a stylised economic model under two polar assumptions: Strategic Complementarities (StCo) dominate or on the contrary are dominated by Strategic Substitutabilities (StSu). Although in the StCo case, "uniqueness" often "buys" "eductive stability", the two issues are strikingly different in the second case. Furthermore if, in the first case, incomplete information often improves "expectational coordination", it may have the converse effect in the StSu case. It is finally argued that, in macroeconomic contexts, StSu often unambiguously dominate StCo, even in a large class of models with Keynesian features, and even in an aggregate framework that magnifies the StCo effects. The "remains" of StCo in general cases are discussed.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
Date: 2005
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.pse.ens.fr/document/wp200507.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pse:psecon:2005-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE Working Papers from PSE (Ecole normale supérieure)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().