On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts

Andrea Attar and Arnold Chassagnon

PSE Working Papers from PSE (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort equilibria developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] and suggests an alternative equilibrium characterization.

Date: 2006
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pse:psecon:2006-51

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