TI-games I: An exploration of Type Indeterminacy in strategic decision-making

Jerry Busemeyer and Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky

PSE Working Papers from PSE (Ecole normale supérieure)

Abstract: The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that formalizes the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we explore an extention of the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making. A 2X2 game is investigated. We first show that in a one-shot simultaneaous move setting the TI-model is equivalent to a standard incomplete information model. We then let the game be preceded by a cheap-talk promise exchange game. We show in an example that in the TI-model the promise stage can have impact on next following behavior when the standard classical model predicts no impact whatsoever. The TI approach differs from other behavioral approaches in identifying the source of the effect of cheap-talk promises in the intrinsic indeterminacy of the players' type.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-upt
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pse:psecon:2009-07

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