Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach

Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock () and Casper G. de Vries ()

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A simple auction-theoretic framewoek is used to examine symmetric litigation environmentswhere the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skillful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; ENVIRONMENT; LEGAL SYSTEM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-09
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Related works:
Working Paper: Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach (2000)
Working Paper: Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach (2004)
Working Paper: Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach (2000)
Journal Article: Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1137

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