Group Cooperation Under Alternative Peer Punishment Technologies: An Experiment

Marco Casari and Luigi Luini

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper experimentally studies peer punishment under three alternative technologies. We find that the choice of peer punishment technology has a substantial impact on group performance. First, under technology where at least two subjects in the group must agree before another group member can be punished, group cooperation and group net earnings are the highest. Second, outcomes are similar regardless of whether punishment choices are simultaneously or sequential. These results suggest that punishment is not perceived as a second-order public good but is instead an emotional reaction unresponsive to changes in the strategic environment.

Keywords: decentralized punishment; public goods; other-regarding preferences; team production; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-exp
Date: 2005-05
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Working Paper: Group Cooperation Under Alternative Peer Punishment Technologies: An Experiment (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1176

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