Peer Punishment in Teams: Emotional or Strategic Choice?

Marco Casari and Luigi Luini

Purdue University Economics Working Papers from Purdue University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Punishing the free-riders of a team can promote group efficiency but is costly for the punisher. For this reason, economists see punishment as a second-order public good. We show in an experiment that subjects do not value punishment for its deterrence but instead for the satisfaction of retaliating. Punishment choices are made with little strategic reasoning.

Keywords: experiments; public goods; informal punishment; emotions; legal systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
Date: 2006-04
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pur:prukra:1188

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