The Control of Land Rent in the Fortified Farming Town

John M. Hartwick

No 1096, Working Papers from Queen's University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider costly administration at the center of a farming community surrounding a fortified village. Land rent taxation is high cost mode of financing central administration in a tax incidence sense. Participatory administration by the governed is a lower cost alternative. We speculate why the low cost option has been out-competed by its higher cost alternative throughout history. We also take up constraints on predation on farmers by a landlord at the center.

Keywords: administrative structure; public goods; welfare cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-his, nep-pbe and nep-ure
Date: 2006-10
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1096

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