Fair Collective Choice Rules: Their Origin and Relationship

Yukihiro Nishimura ()
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Yukihiro Nishimura: Yokohama National University and Queen's University

No 1179, Working Papers from Queen's University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a conceptual framework on fair collective choice rules that synthesizes the studies of Goldman and Sussangkarn (1978) and Suzumura (1981) on the one hand and Tadenuma (2002, 2005) on the other. We show that both frameworks have the following binary relation as a common origin: an allocation x is at least as good as an allocation z if (i) x Pareto dominates z, or (ii) x equity-dominates z. Its transitive-closure and the strict relation derive different ranking criteria, but remarkably, with respect to the maximal elements, they have a set-inclusive relationship.

Keywords: Welfare Economics; Social Choice; Efficiency; Equity; No-Envy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-hpe
Date: 2008-08
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1179

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