Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry

James A. Brander and Barbara Spencer ()

Working Papers from Queen's University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the incentives for using tariffs to extract monopoly rents from imperfectly competitive foreign firms. Using a simple Stackelberg entry deterrence model, the rent-extracting policy is attractive if the foreign firm faces a threat of domestic entry. Despite transportation costs, the Stackelberg leader-follower model can lead to intra-industry trade in the same commodity.

Date: 1980

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry (1981)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:414

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Queen's University, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Mark Babcock ().