Intertemporal Common Property Equilibria: The Fishery

John M. Hartwick

Working Papers from Queen's University, Department of Economics

Abstract: An agent adjusts its harvest in an intertemporal optimization problem taking other agents' harvests as fixed. With stock size affecting harvest costs, an intertemporal externality is present. Cooperative and competitive solutions are compared given an exogenously fixed number of agents. Then an entry-exit relation is introduced. Multiple equilibria obtain for each regime. One cannot say that the competitive solution has too many boats and too small a steady state stock of fish relative to the cooperative regime.

Date: 1980

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:415

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Queen's University, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Mark Babcock ().