A Differential R & D Duopoly Game

John M. Hartwick

Working Papers from Queen's University, Department of Economics

Abstract: At each date, the two players play an R & D investment game "followed" by a Cournot quantity setting game. Each player's R & D augments the common stock of technical knowledge and lowers goods production costs for each player. Profit gross of R & D investment expenditures are quadratic in the state (knowledge here) for each player. R & D investment costs are assumed quadratic in each player's investment. The Nash feedback and Nash open-loop solutions differ in general with the feedback solution being "more competitive", i.e., yielding lower production costs in the steady state.

Keywords: research and development; economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:857

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Queen's University, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Mark Babcock ().