Coordination on Formal vs. de facto Standards: A Dynamic Approach

Paul Belleflamme ()

No 412, Working Papers from Queen Mary, University of London, Department of Economics

Abstract: Formal standards arise out of deliberations of standards-writing organizations, while de facto standards result from unfettered market processes. Therefore, the formers are of a higher quality and legitimacy, but are slower to develop than the latters. To address this trade-off, we analyze a dynamic game where two players choose between one evolving formal standard and one mature de facto standard. The outcome of the game relies on the coordination mechanism used by the players, on the relative value they attach to successful coordination, and on the formal standard's performance at the end of the game.

Keywords: Standardization; Negotiation; Bandwagon (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2000-04

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Journal Article: Coordination on formal vs. de facto standards: a dynamic approach (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp412

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