R&D Cooperation or Competition in the Presence of Cannibalization

Paul Belleflamme ()

No 413, Working Papers from Queen Mary, University of London, Department of Economics

Abstract: R&D cooperation is reconsidered in situations where firms direct R&D activities towards a new product that cannibalizes the firms' existing products. For soft cannibalization, the welfare-maximizing arrangement between firms involves, for low R&D costs, the formation of a separate entity that independently chooses both the output level of the new good and the level of R&D expenditures and otherwise, joint decisions about R&D but independent decisions about production. Yet, as cannibalization increases, firms find it unprofitable to market the new good unless they collaborate more narrowly. Merger should then be permitted for the socially desirable introduction of the new good.

Keywords: R&D cooperation; Joint ventures; Cannibalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-ind and nep-tid
Date: 2000-06

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp413

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