Politicians: Be Killed or Survive

Bruno S. Frey () and Benno Torgler ()

No 242, School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series from School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology

Abstract: In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and strengthened civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect.

Keywords: Assassinations; rational choice; governance; democracy; dictatorship; deterrence; protection. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D70 K14 K42 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-01-27
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http://www.bus.qut.edu.au/faculty/schools/economic ... /2008/242Torgler.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (2008)
Working Paper: Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (2008)
Working Paper: Politicians: Be Killed or Survive (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qut:dpaper:242

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