Competition policy and agreements between firms

Fabian Bergès (), Frédéric M. Loss (), E. Malavoti and Thibaud Vergé ()

Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) from French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse)

Abstract: The European Commission recently considered abolishing the notification system and focusing on a regime of ex-post investigations. Our objective is to show that a better understanding of markets can justify this reform. Whe the precision of the Competition Authority's analysis is not high enough, a ex-ante control, like the notification system, is preferable. On the other hand, if the decision accuracy improves, an ex-post investigation regime achieves a higher social welfare. ...French Abstract : La Commission Européenne a récemment décidé de mettre fin au système de notifications et de recentrer ses activités sur un régime d'enquêtes. L'objectif des auteurs est de montrer qu'une meilleure connaissance des marchés justifie une telle réforme. Lorsque l'analyse des dossiers faite par l'Aurorité de la Concurrence n'est pas suffisamment minutieuse, un controle ex-ante est préférable (comme le système des notifications). En revanche, quand la qualité de jugement s'améliore, un régime ex-post d'enquêtes permet d'atteindre un surplus social plus élevé.

Keywords: COMPETITION POLICY; AGREEMENTS; IMPERFECT AUDITING; CONCURRENCE ECONOMIQUE; REGLEMENTATION ECONOMIQUE; DECISION ADMINISTRATIVE; POLITIQUE ANTITRUST; ENTENTE ECONOMIQUE; CONCENTRATION D'ENTREPRISES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L4 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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