Abstract:
We study trust relations in infinitely repeated interactions. In particular, we study the role different types of reciprocity play in overcoming information asymmetry in trust games
Keywords:trust; dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2004
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More papers in 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Address: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003 Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().
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