Abstract:
Reputation systems have emerged as important sources of information in modern economies. This paper develops a model of reputation systems that puts buyers and sellers inside a stochastic environment involving asymmetric information and search frictions, and gives them a set of options with which to overcome these barriers to trade. This model offers predictions about the effects reputation systems have on the advertising decisions of quality differentiated sellers and the search decisions of buyers. The model also gives fairly general results regarding the welfare effects of reputation systems and provides a framework for analyzing and comparing reputation systems. We also compare equilibrium reputation systems under monopoly, competition, and social planning
More papers in 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Address: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003 Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().
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