Abstract:
We construct a bilateral search model of the housing market in which agents differ in their flow rewards while searching. Buyers and sellers enter the market with high flow rewards, but move at a Poisson rate to a state with low flow rewards if they do not transact in the meantime. We characterize the equilibrium steady state matching pattern and compare this to the constrained efficient matching pattern. We also characterize the joint distribution of price and time to sale (for sellers). The expected price conditional on time to sale falls with time spent on the market, while the conditional variance of price first rises and then falls with time on the market
Keywords:matching; search; housing (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers) New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mic and nep-ure Date: 2004
Downloads: (external link) http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/albrecht/opmatching.pdf main text (application/pdf) Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/albrecht/opmatching.pdf [302 Found]--> https://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/albrecht/opmatching.pdf)
More papers in 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Address: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003 Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().
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