Firm-Specific Training

Christopher Harris and Leonardo Felli ()

No 62, 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper introduces two complementary models of firm-specific training: an informational model and a productivity-enhancement model. In both models, market provision of firm-specific training is inefficient. However, the nature of the inefficiency depends on the balance between the two key components of training, namely productivity enhancement and employee evaluation. In the informational model, training results in a proportionate increase in productivity enhancement and employee valuation, and training is underprovided by the market. In the productivity-enhancement model, training results in an increase in productivity enhancement but no change in employee evaluation, and training is overprovided by the market. In both models, turnover is inefficiently low

Keywords: Learning; Firm-Specific Human Capital; Training (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 D43 J63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004

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Related works:
Working Paper: Firm-Specific Training (2004)
Working Paper: Firm-Specific Training (2004)
Working Paper: Firm-Specific Training (2005)
Working Paper: Firm-Specific Training (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed004:62

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