Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Stephen Morris () and George J. Mailath ()

No 25, 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Keywords: repeated games; private monitoring; almost-public monitoring; coordination; bounded recall (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~gmailath/wpapers/wpapers.html main text (text/html)
http://repec.org/sed2005/up.18218.1101839741.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2004)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2004)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2006)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005)
Journal Article: Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed005:25

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Address: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().