Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities

Vasiliki Skreta and Nicolas Figueroa ()

No 866, 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Keywords: Optimal Auctions; Multiple Objects; Externalities; Mechanism Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 C7 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2005
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/skreta/research.htm main text (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed005:866

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Address: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().