Education and Crime over the Life Cycle

Giulio Fella and Giovanni Gallipoli ()

No 136, 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper provides a framework within which to study the equilibrium impact of alternative policies. We develop an overlapping generation, life-cycle model with endogenous education and crime choices. Education and crime depend on different dimensions of heterogeneity, which takes the form of differences in innate ability and wealth at birth as well as employment shocks. The model is calibrated to match education enrolments, aggregate (property) crime rate and some features of the wealth distribution. In our numerical experiments we find that policies targeting crime reduction through increases in high school graduation rates are more cost-effective than simple incapacitation policies. The cost-effectiveness of high school subsidies increases significantly if they are targeted at the wealth poor. Financial incentives to high school graduation have radically different implications in general and partial equilibrium

Keywords: Crime; Education; Life Cycle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E26 H52 I28 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-edu, nep-law, nep-mac, nep-pbe and nep-ure
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Education and Crime over the Life Cycle (2007)
Working Paper: Education and Crime over the Lifecycle (2006)
Working Paper: Education and Crime over the Life Cycle (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed006:136

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