Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?

Xavier Gabaix () and Augustin Landier

No 518, 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper develops a simple competitive model of CEO pay. It appears to explain much of the rise in CEO compensation in the US economy, without assuming managerial entrenchment, mishandling of options, or theft. CEOs have observable managerial talent and are matched to assets in a competitive assignment model. The marginal impact of a CEO's talent is assumed to increase with the value of the assets under his control. Under very general assumptions, using results from extreme value theory, the model determines the level of CEO pay across firms and over time, and the pay-sensitivity relations. We predict that the level of CEO compensation should increase one for one with the average market capitalization of large firms in the economy. Therefore, the eight-fold increase of CEO pay between 1980 and 2000 can be fully attributed to the increase in market capitalization of large US companies. The model predicts the cross-section Cobb-Douglass relation between pay and firm size and can be used to study other large changes at the top of the income distribution, and offers a benchmark for calibratable corporate finance

Keywords: Executive compensation; wage distribution; Pareto distribution; wage inequality; assignment; incentives; pay performance sensitivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 D3 G34 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-lab
Date: 2006-12-03
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.org/sed2006/up.362.1139973819.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? (2006)
Journal Article: Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed006:518

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Address: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().