Abstract:
We study an economy where firms face credit constraints tied to the value of their assets and financiers differ in their information on the market for firms' assets. Financiers with poor information on the asset market make mistakes in asset liquidation, hoarding assets during booms and trading them during recessions. We find that asset liquidity and the composition -informed versus uninformed- of firms' financiers breed each other in a cumulative fashion and that their interaction generates cycles in asset values and output
More papers in 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Address: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003 Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().
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