Abstract:
We study games in which players search for an optimal action profile. All action profiles are either a success, with a payoff of one, or a failure, with a payoff of zero. Players do not know the location of success profiles; instead each player is privately informed about the marginal distribution of success profiles over his actions. We characterize optimal joint search strategies.
Keywords:Search; Decentralization; Symmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers) JEL-codes:C72C73D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers) New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth Date: Written
More papers in 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Address: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003 Contact information at EDIRC. Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().
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