Redistribution, Taxes, and the Median Voter

Marco Bassetto and Jess Benhabib ()

No 78, 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study a simple model of production, accumulation, and redistribution, where agents are heterogeneous in their initial wealth, and a sequence of redistributive tax rates is voted upon. Though the policy is infinite-dimensional, we prove that a median voter theorem holds if households have identical, Gorman aggregable preferences; furthermore, the tax policy preferred by the median voter has the "bang-bang" property

Keywords: Median voter; gorman aggregation; capital income taxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
Date: 2006-12-03

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/wp2006_02.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Redistribution, taxes, and the median voter (2006)
Journal Article: Redistribution, Taxes and the Median Voter (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed006:78

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Address: Society for Economic Dynamics Anne Stubing CV Starr Center for Applied Economics 269 Mercer Street, Room 303 New York University New York, NY 10003
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().