Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games

Michihiro Kandori and Ichiro Obara

No 253, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: An equilibrium in an infinite horizon game is called a finite state equilibrium, if each player's action on the equilibrium path is given by an automaton with a finite state space. We provide a complete characterization of this class of equilibria and provide a recursive computational method to check the equilibrium conditions. This encompasses the majority of existing works on repeated games with private monitoring.

Date: 2007
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