Economics at your fingertips  

Political Institutions and Greenhouse Gas Controls

Lee Lane and David Montgomery

No 96, Working paper from Regulation2point0

Abstract: Research and insights taken from the field of political economy suggest that institutions limit the extent to which efficient policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are likely to be adopted. High transaction costs among nations, as well as domestic constraints like voter xenophobia and distrust of markets in the U.S. and ineffective legal and economic institutions in China, discourage international agreement. The U.S. must focus upon limiting economic harm from adopting poorly designed policies and developing strategies for adaptation or technology-driven geoengineering. Most importantly, the lessons of political economy must become central to the study of climate policy, including a healthy exchange of views between political economists and climate modelers.

Date: 2008-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) ... r/download.php?id=96 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working paper from Regulation2point0
Series data maintained by Archive Maintainer ().

Page updated 2014-07-29
Handle: RePEc:reg:wpaper:96